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- 40 *Hansard*, VIII, 172, 233, 661, 1045, 1553–7, 1, 2, 7, 15 Feb. 1893.
- 41 *Hansard*, IX, 45–47, 1036, 1226, 21 Feb., 3 Mar., 7 Mar. 1893.
- 42 *Leicester Chronicle & Mercury*, 11 Mar. 1893.
- 43 *Hansard*, XI, 316, 14 Apr 1893.
- 44 *Hansard*, X, 488–9, 658, 20, 21 Mar. 1893, XI 313, 1024, 14, 24 Apr. 1893.
- 45 *Hansard*, XII, 1153, 16 May 1893. Alderman, *Railway Interest* p. 152, lists four known supporters of the railway on the Committee, and six of the traders.
- 46 *First Report of Select Committee on Railway Rates*, 22 Aug. 1893: witness statements of 21 Jul.
- 47 *Mid-Cumberland & North Westmorland Herald*, 21 Jan. 1893
- 48 *Mid-Cumberland & North Westmorland Herald*, 4 Feb. 1893
- 49 *Mid-Cumberland & North Westmorland Herald*, 4 Mar. 1893
- 50 *Leicester Chronicle & Mercury*, 25 Sep. 1893.
- 51 *Hansard* XXII, 138, 12 Mar. 1894; XXIII 225–6, 635, 12, 17 Apr. 1894.
- 52 WHD/2, A.J. Mundella to JW, 21 May 1894. His resigned because of a public enquiry into the affairs of a finance company of which he had been a director.
- 53 Alderman, *Railway Interest* (1973), p. 155.
- 54 *Leicester Chronicle & Mercury*, 28 Apr. 1894.
- 55 *Hansard* XXIV, 1273, 1285, 1535, 25, 29 May 1894.
- 56 *Hansard* XXVI, 101, 22 Jun. 1894.
- 57 *Hansard* XXII 309, 30 Mar. 1894.
- 58 *Hansard* XXIII, 1227, 1661, 24, 30 Apr. 1894.
- 59 *Hansard* XXVI, 1248, 9 Jul. 1894.
- 60 *Hansard* XXIX, 347, 25 Aug. 1894.
- 61 Quoted in *Kendal Mercury & Times*, 17 Aug. 1894, *Westmorland Gazette*, 18 Aug. 1894.
- 62 *Leicester Chronicle & Mercury*, 18 Aug. 1894
- 63 *Wyvern*, 17 Aug. 1894
- 64 *Leicester Express*, 14 Aug. 1894.
- 65 *Penrith Observer*, 8 Aug. 93, 25 Nov. 1893; *Leicester Chronicle & Mercury*, 30 Sep. 1893.
- 66 *Penrith Observer*, 31 Jul. 1894.
- 67 WHD/2, Evans to JW, 13 Aug., Channing to JW 14 Aug., 1894.
- 68 Leicester by-election, 29 Aug. 1894: H. Broadhurst (Lib-Lab) 9464; W. Hazell (Lib) 7184; J. Rolleston (Con) 6967; J. Burgess (ILP) 4,402.
- 69 *Mid-Cumberland & North Westmorland Herald*, 2 Sep. 1893. The Whitehead boxes in the Parliamentary Archive contain no correspondence from Gladstone. There is no mention of him in the Gladstone Diaries.
- 70 WHD/2 contains a note from Rosebery on 12 Jun. 1895, responding to an invitation from Lady Whitehead to a garden party.
- 71 WHD/2, Broadhurst to JW, 19 Sep. 1900.
- 72 Quoted in Radford, *Sir James Whitehead*.
- 73 WHD/2, E. R. Brice to JW, 9 Dec. 1898 (Borstals), W. Gilbey to JW, 20 Feb. 1901 (Hill Trust).
- 74 *London Gazette*, 7 Apr. 1893. See D. G. Paterson, 'The Failure of British Business in Canada, 1890–1914', University of British Columbia Discussion paper (1974) p. 20.
- 75 *Leicester Chronicle & Mercury*, 28 Oct. 1893, quoting a letter to the *Westminster Gazette*.
- 76 WHD/2, W. J. Soulsby to JW, 31 May 1917. Soulsby was formerly secretary at Mansion House.
- 77 *Hansard*, 4th series vols. CLIII–CXCVIII (Mar. 1906–Dec 1908); 5th series III–XII (Apr.–Oct. 1909) passim.
- 78 *Hansard*, CLXX, 1112–1120, 8 Mar. 1907.
- 79 WHD/4, R. McKenna to RW, 13 Nov. 1909.
- 80 Email from Sir Philip Whitehead to the author, 8 Jan 2015.
- 81 WHD/2. J. W. Crombie to JW, 16 and 18 Jul 1894.
- 82 P. J. Cain, 'The British Railway Rates Problem, 1894–1913', *Business History* XX, 1 (1978), pp. 87–97. The landmark case was *Smith & Forrest v London & North Western and others*.
- 83 A. Connell, 'The Strange Case of Mr Rigg', *Journal of Liberal History*, 60 (Autumn 2008), pp. 14–22. Rigg was later mayor of Westminster.

Reports

Europe: The Liberal commitment

Evening meeting, 1 February 2016, with Sir Graham Watson and Lord William Wallace. Chair: Baroness Julie Smith.

Report by **David Cloke**

HOW AND WHY did the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats all end up as the strongest supporters of Britain's membership of the European Economic Community and its successor institutions? Has it helped or hindered the party's political achievements? Have developments in Europe since the EEC's founding Treaty of Rome in 1958 reflected the party's European faith? Earlier in the year, as a referendum on Britain's membership of the EU seemed increasingly on the cards, the Liberal Democrat History Group

met to discuss the historic Liberal commitment and record, with Sir Graham Watson (Liberal Democrat MEP 1994–2014) and Lord William Wallace (Liberal Democrat Foreign Office minister in the coalition government, 2010–15).

In introducing the speakers, Baroness Smith noted that they had kindly agreed to divide the subject up between them chronologically, with Sir Graham beginning with the roots of Liberalism's European outlook and Lord Wallace picking up the story from the Second World War.

Sir Graham started by warning attendees that he was not a historian, other than as a chronicler of events in which he had been involved. His contribution was as a practitioner of politics rather than an interpreter. As Baroness Smith has noted, his practice had made him very well qualified for the discussion: former leader of the ALDE group in the European Parliament and president of the ALDE Party, and now a member of its economic and social committee.

For Sir Graham the first question to be asked was how far back one could trace evidence of British Liberal ideas about the value of pooling sovereignty to unite Europe. Some, such as Piers Ludlow of the LSE, were sceptical that the idea even went back to the late nineteenth century. But, as a romantic, Sir Graham believed that it was possible to trace the idea back to the late eighteenth century and the awakening of revulsion both at the continental despots and also at the 'John Bull' style militarism that

built up as Britain approached the Napoleonic Wars. It could be seen, Watson noted, in the works of such radical poets as Oliver Goldsmith and Robert Burns and the calls for the brotherhood of man, or ‘brethren in a common cause’ as Burns put it, as a means of putting to an end the almost constant wars in Europe.

In 1759 Emmanuel Kant had launched the idea of a league of nations in his book *Perpetual Peace*. Adam Smith not only talked about the importance of trade but in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) highlighted the importance of rules to govern it. These rules would need to be agreed by intergovernmental treaty, but the body to enforce them had to be, by implication Watson argued, supranational. These works represented the basic philosophical roots, the wellspring of Liberal thinking on Europe, Watson believed. However, it was not until the development of parliamentary democracy in the nineteenth century that the idea of a united Europe began to take shape. De Tocqueville’s *America* published in 1838 demonstrated that a united states of Europe was a logical possibility and also that ‘the working classes could govern a state’. It also suggested, Watson argued, that democracy and a United States of Europe might go hand in hand.

Interestingly, Watson frequently called on the works of poets and writers to support his case and often the examples he gave seemed ahead of their time. At this point Watson quoted Tennyson (no noted radical) from ‘Locksley Hall’ of 1841 when he looked forward to a time when the ‘war drum throbs no longer and the battle flags are furled in the parliament of man, the federation of the world.’

Six years on in 1847 and after his great achievement of the ending of tariffs in agriculture, Richard Cobden undertook a European tour. Despite having a domestic reputation as a ‘little Englander’, mostly as a result of his suspicion of Imperial involvements, to Europe, Watson noted, Cobden was what J. A. Hobson late called ‘the international man’. Throughout a Europe run by authoritarian monarchies or by opportunists, his visit had been eagerly awaited by those yearning for freedom. He was greeted by formal committees of welcome, and those committees, Watson pointed out, became the revolutionary movements of 1848. In that upheaval which affected almost every European nation, the ideas of democracy, nationalism and international cooperation were uppermost.

The revolutions of 1848 failed, however: Russia’s crushing of resistance in Hungary allowed Austria in turn to crush Italian nationalism. And then, Watson argued, after the near catastrophic war with Russia in the Crimea, Britain withdrew from active engagement in continental affairs. Nonetheless, Watson noted, the Liberal academics of the mid-nineteenth century, such as Matthew Arnold and T. H. Green, kept the cause alive and were seen as conspicuous defenders of reason versus clerical dogma and of universal values against national exceptionalism.

At the height of the struggle over the Second Reform Bill in 1867, a group of Liberal academics published *Essays on Reform and Questions for a Reformed Parliament*. In these they called for an alternative to monarchy and to class rule, for participatory government and the extension of the franchise, arguing that by giving each voter a sense of individual responsibility Britain would move from a class-based society to a genuine commonwealth. At the same time, enthusiasm for movements against continental oppression such as those headed by Mancini in Italy and by Kossuth in Hungary, led them to supporting a more unified idea of continental engagement.

Many of these ideas were brought together with the formation of the Liberal Party in 1859 – inspired in part, Watson suggested, by a belief in international engagement born of self-confidence. Watson also noted that the idea that nationality should make concessions to supranational government featured in a number of plans. Bryce’s *Studies of the Holy Roman Empire* in 1867 was essentially propaganda for European federalism, and his followers backed the establishment of a league of nations as a means of ending secret diplomacy. In Scotland, James Larnier’s European federation proposal of 1884 outlined how it would work: a European Assembly and a European senate elected by PR, a European civil service and an ambitious programme of international public works. In 1889 the International Parliamentary Union was established, which was essentially a European one.

Indeed, despite Britain being a world power with a worldwide naval and trading presence, the important issues of foreign policy, Watson argued, were almost exclusively European. The focus of British foreign policy was the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, and the most important colonial issues were

always decided in Europe. Engagement was, therefore, essential for the achievement of Liberal Imperial goals.

At this time, Watson noted, Gladstone, in his concept of ‘international public right’ and Mill and Acton in their defence of intellectual and personal freedom, were putting forward the same kind of ‘universals’ as the EU existed to promote, recognising that these can be constrained, as in America, by populist pressure, or by bureaucracy. Watson also argued that Gladstone had an important influence on Liberal thinking on Europe and on the British consciousness as he shifted the perspective of foreign policy from Empire to Europe. As did Cobden and the Manchester School’s concept of economic integration as a route to peace.

Gladstone saw Europe as a family of nations with a common law and common interests, a product of Hellenic discipline and Christian moralism. He had a strong hands-on engagement with European affairs in the two and a half decades that he dominated British politics, supporting international peace movements and encouraging peoples to strive for independence from foreign rulers. He believed in Europe and strove to cultivate the concept of Europe. This was not, however, devoid of national interest: there were benefits for Britain in keeping peaceful relations with the continental powers.

The Manchester School, meanwhile, spoke of the inevitable advance of free trade: in Cobden’s words, ‘breaking down the barriers which separate nations, those barriers behind which nestle the feelings of pride, revenge, hatred and jealousy which every now and then burst their bounds and deluge whole countries in blood.’ Free trade would usher in an era of universal peace. Watson noted that Gladstone also adopted the belief that free trade would enhance world unity and lessen the danger of war. Indeed, he believed that the 1860 commercial treaty with France had averted war on the continent.

What was not clear to Watson was whether, at the time, these political and economic views were seen as being aligned. He thought that that it was unlikely, though he believed that Gladstone himself must have been aware. It was also worth noting the contrary view expressed by the Conservatives as evidenced by their political pamphlets. One highlighted Britain as a great power and, focusing on the Empire, declared themselves ready ‘to fight for Canada as for



The signing ceremony for the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the Treaty of Rome), at the Palazzo dei Conservatori on Capitoline Hill, Rome, 25 March 1957

Kent'. They perceived Britain as having no European interest.

Sadly, in Watson's view, the ideas of European integration seemed to disappear with Gladstone's departure from British politics and the entry of the country into an era of Imperial reaction and Empire free trade. Nonetheless, Gladstone was, Watson argued, the key incubator of the European idea in the Liberal consciousness.

For twenty years the European trail goes cold with little evidence of thinking about the politics of a united Europe. Domestic reform dominated Liberal politics. Only Lord Bryce kept the flame alive, and with G. L. Dickinson proposed the idea of an international union, setting up a group of like-minded people to draft a proposal for a league of nations. The League of Nations Union of 1914 Watson believed, laid the basis for a government commission in 1918 and Woodrow Wilson's proposals in 1920. Whilst it was supposed to be universal it was essentially European, its languages English, French and Spanish, its objective one of keeping the European nations at peace.

The years following the First World War saw Liberalism embattled but also saw (perhaps as a consequence) the development of cooperation across parties. In 1924 Ramsay Muir and Gilbert Murray were present at a meeting that would prove to be the genesis of Liberal

International and in 1939 Beveridge established the Federal Union Research Institute in Oxford.

If Liberalism was embattled after the First World War, Watson noted that the Second almost killed it off. But the yearning for a Liberal European order continued in Britain. Small practical efforts were made to bring people together, such as John Macmillan Scott's 1946 delegation of Young Liberals to Norway to begin the establishment of Liberal International. This was followed by a meeting with Belgian parliamentarians organised by Sir Percy Harris in 1947 and a conference of Liberal parliamentarians from ten European countries (including Germany) in London in 1949 which called for greater European cooperation in all areas. It was the first meeting of international politicians to come up with a fully European programme. As Macmillan Scott had said, 'in the new world opening up life would be lived across borders not behind them'.

Watson noted that there were tensions within Liberalism between classical European ideas – and the practical means of working within the European Community – and the transatlantic focus of British foreign policy. These were picked up later by Wallace and in questions from the floor. Despite these tensions Liberals kept pressing on, with the founding of the Liberal Movement for a United Europe in 1952, with wider

public recognition of the issues coming, in Watson's view and somewhat ironically, following the failed Anglo-French cooperation over Suez. This debacle also marked a turning point in the party's electoral fortunes. Whether the association of the Liberal Party with the European idea helped or hindered it was harder to identify; however, Watson closed by saying he believed that it was a moot point in any event as the party 'knew no other way'.

William Wallace sought to outline the development of Liberal thinking regarding the European ideal following the Second World War and place it within the context of the varied responses in Britain to the new world. He started by thinking about where he had come in; how did he assume that he was in favour of European integration. He had joined the party in 1960, like many, charmed and won over by Jo Grimond. He had told him that he was a European and so he was!

How much then did the party understand the implications of its gut European commitment? Wallace said that he was not sure that many of them really did. Not many people really looked into the details of the EEC, indeed, his wife, Helen, found herself at twenty-seven, one of the leading experts on the subject when the few people older than her with an interest in the area left to work in the Commission! And a look at the party's manifestos from the time revealed that the details were not spelt out clearly.

Wallace outlined that after the war ended in 1945, there was a range of attitudes to Europe amongst Britons. There was a feeling that the continent was as a dangerous place and Britain could easily get swamped; a fear of war and of Britain being left alone again; and view that it was a necessity but one which cost us most and gained us least. This was Churchill's view when he expounded his redefinition of Britain in the world in the late '40s and early '50s: an Anglo-Saxon country with three circles of global influence – its relationships with the United States, the British Commonwealth and Empire, and Europe. Wallace added that Britain had very reluctantly committed troops to the European continent in 1954 after deep debate and concern about another Dunkirk.

The post-war Liberal Party, meanwhile, assumed that it had to be in favour of Europe. The 1947 and 1948 Assemblies passed federal resolutions and it had the sense that being an internationalist

Report: Europe – the Liberal commitment

meant being in favour of world government – and as that was not possible immediately, European government was at least a step forward.

Nonetheless, Europe divided the party in the late '40s and early '50s. Wallace noted that there was a clear divide between economic liberals and social liberals and also between those committed to free trade and those committed to building a social market economy in Europe rather than a free trade one. To be fair to the free trade Liberals, Wallace highlighted that they were very much affected by the sense that the conflict was between totalitarianism and freedom, and thus they supported a small state, strong free markets and open borders. Against them were the Social Liberals (some of whom, like Megan Lloyd-George, left the party in the late '40s) who wanted a social market economy.

The divide spilled over into rowdy Assemblies in the early 1950s. A number of free marketeers left and founded the People's League for the Defence of Freedom in 1956. On the left, the radical Liberals such as Frank Owen, Jo Grimond and Desmond Banks, founded the Radical Reform Group which itself disaffiliated from the party in 1954 only to re-affiliate a year later. The division was essentially between the Keynesian and Hayekian views of the economy and between the individual and community views of freedom.

As a questioner noted later, the last significant debate on the subject was at the 1960 Liberal Assembly with the remains of the anti-EEC group furious at the party's support for the common market. They were roundly defeated and seemed, after that, to disappear. Wallace agreed that 1960 proved to be last hurrah for the group, which included some significant figures in the party who had been candidates in the 1950 and 1951 general elections and had made substantial contributions to it. As far as Wallace could recall, the only figure who was associated with them who remained in the party was Roy Douglas. Under Jo Grimond's charisma the party became European.

Wallace was of the opinion – often argued at History Group events – that Suez was the turning point in all sorts of ways. It strengthened the Liberal mindset on policy, most notably in the form of deep opposition to Imperial nostalgia, to the insistence that Britain be a world power, to the view that Britain should hang on to the colonies for as long as possible (many active Liberals, including Jo Grimond, were involved in the campaigns for colonial freedom in the 1950s), and to the independent nuclear deterrent which symbolised that Britain was more important than its European partners. Wallace also noted later in response to a question that the party was strongly against the idea that sovereignty was important and that this came across in papers published by the *Unservile State*, notably in 'The Illusion of Sovereignty' that he had written.

Consequently, the party argued that Britain should accept that it was fundamentally European and should seek to get on with its European neighbours. In 1960 Grimond published a policy paper entitled 'Britain Must Join', and a later paper by Christopher Layton proposed following the French model of economic policy, thus indicating that the party saw it as not just a model for Europe but for Britain. A questioner later noted that the party's natural Europeanism at this time was why he became a Liberal: it made sense and related to his personal experience.

Wallace again highlighted the lack of detailed understanding of the issues and the lack of contact with continental Liberal parties. Christopher Layton, Richard Moore and a handful of others sought to tackle this problem, and younger members built contacts through organisations such as WFLRY – the World Federation of Liberal and Radical Youth – run by Margareta Holmstedt.

Wallace noted, however, that following De Gaulle's veto the European question seemed to fall down the agenda. Nonetheless, among the three conditions that Grimond put to the Labour government when it lost its majority in 1965 was a shift in foreign policy from

East of Suez to Europe. And when the second application was made in 1969, Assembly passed a resolution strongly supporting it. With both the main parties split on the issue in 1971–72, Wallace pointed out that the Liberals contributed to the majority on one of the key votes on whether to join. (It was later pointed out, however, that Emlyn Hooson had at least abstained on that vote because of concerns about the impact of agricultural policy on farmers in his constituency.) Thus, Wallace argued, the party was both beginning to gain a reputation as the pro-European party, and it was also beginning to understand what the policy meant in practice. This then featured in the manifestos of the 1974 general elections.

From accession, the party had to learn a lot more about its sister parties and about the patterns of the then much simpler EEC. Wallace noted that he hadn't realised how anti-Catholic some of the European Liberal parties were, or, indeed, the extent to which it had formed a part of his own thinking. There were deep arguments over the building of a European Liberal Party. British Liberals were concerned about having too many economic Liberals and not enough social Liberals in the group, with arguments about French representation: should the Republicans be allowed to join (as they wished) or should the French Radicals instead? We also favoured Radical Venstre, but not Venstre and were keen to involve D66 in Holland. Wallace had also sought to bolster the social liberal wing of the FDP in the mid 1970s, but, he noted, most of them left over the following decade.

Connections were also built within British politics most notably during the 1975 referendum campaign. The Liberals had more experts on the subject than either of the other two parties and began to build links with pro-Europeans in the other parties from which, Wallace noted, was later built the Alliance between the Liberal Party and the SDP.

Despite the loss of representation in the European Parliament following

Future History Group meetings

- Sunday 18 September, Liberal Democrat conference, Brighton: **Coalition: could Liberal Democrats have handled it better?** with David Laws, Chris Huhne, Akash Paun and Jo Swinson (see back page for full details)
- January/February 2017: AGM and speaker meeting, provisionally related to Liberal International's 60th anniversary
- Friday 17 or Saturday 18 March 2017, Liberal Democrat conference, York; details to be announced

the introduction of direct elections and the failure to get PR for them through the Lib–Lab pact, the party remained strongly pro-European and anti-imperialist. Thatcher meanwhile, moved from being a pro-European to a sceptic, and one who believed the myth of Britain being apart from Europe. Her view, as Thatcher said to Helen Wallace after her Bruges speech was that ‘they owe us so much’. Wallace later added in response to a question that one should not underestimate the impact of the Falklands War. It reinforced the image of Britain as an independent military power and harked back to the trope of Britain as a country standing alone against the odds. Thatcher picked it up and linked it, with Reagan, to images of the Second World War. This had sunk the party’s view of Britain’s place in the world.

Wallace added that there had been few opportunities for the party to put forward its view of Britain in the world and in Europe, though he did admit that it had not taken up the opportunities that had existed at the insistence, he later noted, of the party’s campaigners. He also deprecated the failure of Blair to follow through the indications given in the talks between Labour and the Liberal Democrats in 1996. Nonetheless, the party essentially remained committed to its view that the European

ideal was a common enterprise aimed at building a Keynesian social market at a European level.

Questioners asked whether there was a tension between the localism and Europeanism of the Liberal Party and Liberal Democrats, about the strength of the European commitment in the modern party and whether it had had an impact on the party’s willingness to argue for the reform of European institutions.

Wallace agreed that it was hard to reconcile the concept of giving more powers to Brussels with devolution, noting that Brussels appeared to be and was very remote, and he believed that it was a tension that had yet to be fully reconciled. Julie Smith noted that a number of new members to the party did not appear to share the instinctive pro-European position of longstanding members. She noted as an aside that she had come from the SDP which had been the only party not to split on the subject. Wallace also thought that part of the problem might be the general loss of faith in managers, leaders and elites. Graham Watson agreed that the party had perhaps been inhibited about calling for reform but, he argued that this was because the whole discourse was about attack on the European idea and the natural instinct was to defend it.

Questions were also asked about the lessons to be learned from the 1975

referendum, and what the role of the party should be in the current campaign. Watson argued that the main lesson was that the campaigns would be very different. In 1975 the whole political establishment and media supported the Yes campaign and the rest of Europe no longer appeared prosperous and unthreatening. The so far unimpressive Remain campaign needed to find an emotional appeal, Wallace believed. It also needed to tackle the myth of excessive European regulation. Did those that wanted to leave want no health and safety regulation, nothing on food safety? He also noted that such regulations could be tougher in the United States where the New York State Attorney General had actually gone after bankers. Many other issues could also only be tackled at a European or global level such as climate change and tax avoidance.

Meanwhile, Watson argued that the specific role of the Liberal Democrats was quite limited. It alone, would probably change few people’s minds. It would, however, play significant part in the wider Remain campaign and through the connections it made could bring in new members to the party.

David Cloke is a member of the Liberal Democrat History Group’s executive.

Reviews

Lloyd George in cartoons

Alan Mumford, *David Lloyd George: A Biography in Cartoons* (Matador, 2014)

Review by **Kenneth O. Morgan**

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE was God’s gift for cartoonists. Whereas contemporaries like Asquith seemed prosaic and conventional, L.G. captivated his observers for almost half a century with a career full of vitality and versatility. In February 1934, (in a cartoon not in this book) Strube in the Daily Express portrayed him with Sir Henry Lytton of d’Oyly Carte, reflecting, as

two ‘Old Savoyards’ on how one man in his life played many parts. Beyond them stands a tableau of miscellaneous Lloyd Georges, the Welsh bard, the court jester, the Birmingham policeman, the rat-catcher of Limehouse, and, brooding in the background, ‘the man who won the war’. From the Boer War onwards, he bewitched the great cartoonists of the day – Staniforth, Gould, Reed, Partridge,

Raven Hill, Strube, David Low, Vicky. In return, they contributed immensely to his rise to the top – and, to some lesser degree, to his descent thereafter. Of all politicians, he became the great cultural artefact of his time.

It is a fascinating theme and is covered entertainingly by Alan Mumford, himself both a notable political cartoonist and a historian of the genre who has previously produced volumes on cartoonists’ treatment of the Labour and Conservative parties. While his sketch of Lloyd George’s life is prosaic, the accompanying cartoons, enterprisingly culled from a miscellany of archives, are enormously revealing, both of the man, and of the culture of his time. No one, it seems, could reach a settled view of his image. He appeared in magazines like *Punch*, the *Westminster Gazette* or the *Bystander* in guises varying from a highwayman