

# The Liberal Party and the South African War 1899–1902

The South African War of 1899–1902, commonly known as the Boer War, brought to a head long-standing divisions in the Liberal Party over its attitude to empire and foreign policy and very nearly led to a permanent split along the lines of the 1886 Liberal Unionist secession. The 1900 general election saw the party reach the nadir of its pre-1914 electoral fortunes, when it suffered an unprecedented second successive landslide defeat. Internal feuding between supporters and opponents of the war threatened to lead a permanent division in the Liberal ranks, along the lines of the Liberal Unionist secession of 1886. Yet, within four years of the war's end the Liberals were back in power, having themselves won a landslide majority. Paradoxically, although the war led to the Liberal defeat in 1900, its legacy contributed to the 1906 victory.

## Empire and the Liberal Party

The divisions in the Liberal Party that the war accentuated had their origins in differing views on how the party should cope with the growing enthusiasm for empire among the electorate during the 1880s and 1890s. On these issues the party divided into three camps. Many Liberals believed the party should follow in the footsteps of Cobden, Bright and Gladstone in supporting 'peace, retrenchment and reform'. They opposed overseas expansion and entanglements as wrong in themselves and as drains on the exchequer. Many backbench Liberal MPs felt that it was a fundamental purpose of the party to maintain what they saw as the 'Liberal tradition' of a pacific foreign and imperial policy. Some leading figures in the party such as Sir William Harcourt

(leader in the House of Commons from 1894 to 1898) and John Morley, Gladstone's biographer, were inclined to sympathise with these views.<sup>1</sup> However, some Liberals (dubbed 'Liberal Imperialists') believed that a policy of opposition to imperial expansion was an electoral albatross for the Liberal Party. Lord Rosebery, Gladstone's successor as Prime Minister, and rising stars such as Sir Edward Grey, R. B. Haldane and H. H. Asquith felt that the party was in danger of being portrayed as unpatriotic – willing to countenance the dismantling of empire and thus the decline of British power. Rosebery wanted the party to shake off the Gladstonian legacy and positively embrace empire. Although he resigned from the Liberal leadership in 1896, a year after his government was defeated in a general election, he remained a 'king over the water' for many Liberals who sympathised with his views.<sup>2</sup>

The third strand of opinion was represented by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal leader from 1899. Campbell-Bannerman belonged to the centre of the party, describing himself as 'a Liberal and an imperialist enough for any decent man'.<sup>3</sup> He and many mainstream Liberals broadly supported the Cobden/Gladstone tradition, but saw the need for the party to be pragmatic. They recognised that hostility to empire was not electorally popular, but equally they rejected the views of the Liberal Imperialists who seemed prepared to abandon Liberal principles altogether in the cause of electoral expediency. Campbell-Bannerman's views were shared by a substantial section of the party but, as is often the case when parties suffer debilitating splits, those at either extreme were unwilling to unite around a compromise policy for the sake of party unity. Given

the nature of these divisions, an imperial war was guaranteed to highlight and widen the faultlines within the Liberal Party.

## Britain and South Africa 1877–1899

The war in South Africa was the culmination of a quarter of a century's efforts by British governments to establish supremacy in the region, which was seen as a vital British strategic interest as a key point on the route to India. South Africa consisted of the two British colonies of the Cape and Natal and two independent Dutch republics, Transvaal and Orange Free State. In 1877 Disraeli's government annexed the Transvaal, but after an uprising by Transvaalers and the defeat of a British army at the battle of Majuba Hill in 1881, the new Liberal government effectively restored its independence under British suzerainty. The discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886 made matters more pressing as it meant that the Transvaal could be in an economically dominant position within South Africa.<sup>4</sup> Over the following decade Britain tried to force the Transvaal into accepting a British-dominated South African federation.

At the end of 1895 the Cape Prime Minister, Cecil Rhodes, engineered the 'Jameson Raid', an invasion of the Transvaal in support of a planned rising by the Uitlanders – British citizens living in the Transvaal who dominated the gold mining industry there. The rising did not take place and the raid ended in fiasco with the invading force being captured by Transvaal commandos. The embarrassment of the raid's failure was compounded by a widespread suspicion that the Unionist Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, was complicit in its planning.<sup>5</sup> However, when a House of Commons committee of inquiry into the raid made no criticism of the government the Liberal leader, Sir William Harcourt, who served on the committee, was widely felt to have let Chamberlain off the hook. Yet, since the inquiry took place at a time when delicate negotiations were taking place with the Transvaal and in the middle of Queen Victoria's

Diamond Jubilee year, Harcourt's room for manoeuvre was constrained by the need to avoid appearing unpatriotic. The Jameson Raid episode highlighted the dilemma the Liberals faced in opposing the government on matters that appeared to involve Britain's vital national interests – a dilemma which was to recur during the war.<sup>6</sup>

To recover Britain's position after the raid, the government appointed Sir Alfred Milner as High Commissioner to the Cape Colony in 1897. Milner, a committed imperialist who described himself as a 'British race patriot',<sup>7</sup> was a highly-regarded administrator and had close links with the Liberal Imperialists, sharing a Balliol background with Asquith and Grey. He was determined to bring matters to a head and assert British supremacy in South Africa. After abortive negotiations during the summer of 1899, Britain despatched troops to South Africa in September and in response the Transvaal and the Orange Free State launched a pre-emptive invasion of Natal.

## The outbreak of war

From the start Campbell-Bannerman as Liberal leader tried to resolve the problem of how to lead an opposition party during wartime, without appearing unpatriotic. His position was made more difficult by the fact that British territory had been invaded and, in the early part of the war, was under enemy occupation, so opposition to the war was not a realistic political option.<sup>8</sup> Campbell-Bannerman pursued a middle course, agreeing to vote supplies for the war, but criticising the government's aggressive diplomacy in dealing with the Transvaal. But while many Liberal MPs could support this position, there were many on either wing of the party who would not rally round it.

Splits in the party became apparent almost immediately after the outbreak of war. An amendment to the Queen's Speech in October criticising the government's diplomacy, moved by Liberal MP Philip Stanhope, won the support of fifty-five Liberal MPs even though the leadership abstained.<sup>9</sup> Liberals who

opposed the war saw it as the party's duty to follow in the tradition of Gladstone's 1879–80 Midlothian campaign and defend the rights of small nations. However, Liberal MPs who were involved in anti-war agitation were mostly obscure and eccentric backbenchers, while their sympathisers at the higher levels of the party remained circumspect.<sup>10</sup> Thus anti-war Liberals were unable to impose their policy on the party leadership. Many Liberal opponents of the war became involved in non-party organisations such as the South Africa Conciliation Committee and the more extreme Stop-the-War Committee. In February 1900 some of them set up the League of Liberals Against Militarism and Aggression as a pressure group for anti-war Liberals.

Opponents of the war were dubbed 'pro-Boers' by their opponents, and often adopted the label themselves as a badge of defiance.<sup>11</sup> In response to the creation of the League of Liberals Against Militarism and Aggression, Liberal Imperialists founded the Imperial Liberal Council in the spring of 1900, although the most famous Liberal Imperialists such as Rosebery, Asquith, Haldane and Grey held aloof from the Council as it was inconsistent with their previously expressed criticisms of the factionalism of the pro-Boers. For Liberal Imperialists the war offered an opportunity to restore the party's patriotic credentials by putting party differences aside and supporting the government.<sup>12</sup> In June 1900 the Imperial Liberal Council scored a propaganda victory when it managed to get thirty-eight Liberal MPs to vote with the government on a pro-Boer motion on the defence estimates, while only thirty Liberal MPs voted for the motion itself.<sup>13</sup>

The initial months of the war saw a series of humiliating setbacks for the British forces, but from early 1900 fortunes changed. The news of the relief of the siege of Mafeking arrived on 18 May, and led to spontaneous patriotic demonstrations in major towns and cities and attacks on the homes of prominent pro-Boers. In Battersea, the future cabinet minister John Burns had his windows smashed by a jingoistic mob.<sup>14</sup> In June Campbell-Bannerman

gave his support to the principle of annexing the two republics, while calling for a swift granting of self-government.<sup>15</sup> With the war apparently won, it was widely expected that the government would call a general election to capitalise on the wave of patriotic feeling that followed British military success. On 25 September Parliament was dissolved and a general election called.

## The 'khaki election'

Unionist victory was a foregone conclusion. By the summer of 1899 the Liberal Chief Whip Herbert Gladstone admitted that the party was not up to

fighting a general election<sup>16</sup> and shortly before the dissolution he wrote to his party leader 'I have had some disgusting rebuffs in my appeals for money... a disgusting number of candidates have skied off'.<sup>17</sup> The Liberals allowed the Unionists 143 unopposed returns – an all-time high since the 1867 Reform Act.<sup>18</sup> In its manifesto, the party tried to salvage its patriotic reputation by praising the 'genius' of Lord Roberts, the Commander in Chief in South Africa, as well as criticising both the diplomacy that had led to the war and the government's opportunism in trying to cash in electorally on military success.<sup>19</sup> The Unionists attempted to tar all Liberals

with the pro-Boer brush, Joseph Chamberlain notoriously claiming that 'a vote for the Liberal is a vote for the Boer'.<sup>20</sup> The result was a landslide defeat for the Liberals – the first time since before the 1832 Reform Act that they had lost two general elections in a row. John Auld, in his study of the Liberal pro-Boers, has calculated that on average pro-Boer candidates performed around three per cent worse than the average Liberal, although mainstream and imperialist Liberals were not immune from the tide flowing in favour of the Unionists.<sup>21</sup>

This election has been dubbed the first 'khaki election', anticipating that of 1918. However, the view that the election result demonstrated the electorate's support for war and empire has been challenged, particularly by Richard Price and Henry Pelling.<sup>22</sup> Price has argued that to the working classes the war was less important than questions of social reform and that local issues had a significant impact on individual results. But while such factors may have made a difference in some constituencies, it remains the case that the war was the dominant issue. The cases cited by Pelling and Price only show that there were a few minor deviations in some constituencies from the broader electoral trend against the Liberals. Until the summer of 1899 the Liberals had been making steady gains at by-elections, to the extent that they might have hoped to win the next general election with a small majority. Their electoral fortunes changed with the outbreak of war. Every by-election fought between the outbreak of war in October 1899 and the summer of 1900 showed a swing to the Unionists as voters rallied to the government's patriotic call.<sup>23</sup> There can be little doubt, therefore, that the war was the decisive factor in the Liberal defeat.

Electoral adversity was not enough to bring the party together. The Imperial Liberal Council continued to scheme against the Campbell-Bannerman leadership. The election result seemed to justify its analysis of the Liberal Party's weaknesses and in October it issued a manifesto that repudiated Campbell-Bannerman and demanded that the party:

Anti-war meetings frequently ended in violence as a result of the attentions of jingo crowds. (*Punch*, 4 April 1900)



... distinguish Liberals in whose policy with regard to Imperial questions patriotic voters may justly repose confidence from those whose opinions naturally disqualify them from controlling the action of the Imperial Parliament.<sup>24</sup>

Sir Edward Grey threatened to disown Campbell-Bannerman's leadership and even the Chief Whip Herbert Gladstone wobbled, calling on Campbell-Bannerman to support Rosebery and Milner.<sup>25</sup>

However, neither the pro-Boers nor the Liberal Imperialists were able to influence the party decisively in their direction. Neither group wanted to split from the party, but each wished that their opponents would either leave or keep quiet. The Liberal Imperialists wanted to see a re-launched Liberal Party, shed of its unpopular ideological baggage – a project that bears similarities to the re-branding of the Labour Party as 'New Labour' nearly a century later. However, the Liberal Imperialists lacked a Tony Blair – a leader with the determination to fight and win the internal battles that would have to take place before the party could be reformed. Instead they looked to Rosebery, who continued to remain aloof from politics while tantalising his supporters with speeches that hinted at a return. Lacking clear and decisive leadership, the various Liberal Imperialist attempts to win control of the party were indecisive and unfocused.<sup>26</sup>

The pro-Boers had their problems too, having had their numbers depleted at the general election and experiencing throughout the war the break-up of their meetings by jingoistic crowds.<sup>27</sup> Famously, in 1901, Lloyd George spoke at an anti-war meeting at Birmingham Town Hall, the heart of Joseph Chamberlain's fiefdom, which ended with a riot by a jingoistic crowd.<sup>28</sup> With no faction able to deliver a knockout blow to its opponents, Campbell-Bannerman continued to lead as best he could. Attacks on him by Liberal Imperialists consolidated his support on the centre and left of the party. But he was careful to keep lines of communication open with the Liberal Imperialists, especially Asquith.

## Methods of barbarism

In the summer of 1901 there was another outbreak of warfare within the party. This was precipitated by the Liberal Imperialists' lionising of Milner when he returned home on leave in May.<sup>29</sup> For many Liberals, Milner's intransigence was the reason for war breaking out and for the Boers' refusal to surrender even when their territory had formally been annexed. But the party leadership had to be sensitive about attacking him because Asquith, Grey and Haldane supported him.<sup>30</sup>

The methods used by the British Army to defeat the Boers were strongly opposed by both pro-Boers and mainstream Liberals. In response to the guerrilla tactics used by the Boer commandos, the British army tried to cut off Boer supplies by rounding up civilians and putting them into concentration camps, and by burning Boer farms. The aim was to starve the Boers into submission. The death rate in the camps was very high: by the end of the war around 28,000 Boers had died in the camps – more than the number of troops on both sides killed in the war.<sup>31</sup>

Emily Hobhouse (sister of the writer L. T. Hobhouse) visited the camps on behalf of the South African Women and Children Distress Fund. On her return to England in 1901, she attempted to publicise her findings, which were very critical of the conditions she had witnessed. She met Campbell-Bannerman who agreed to speak out against the concentration camp policies, which he did at a dinner on 14 June, saying:

A phrase often used is that 'war is war', but when one comes to ask about it one is told that no war is going on, that it is not war. When is a war not a war? When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa.<sup>32</sup>

Although Campbell-Bannerman's denunciation of 'methods of barbarism' has been a source of pride to Liberals of later eras, at the time it was considered a blunder, even by many of his own supporters, because it was seen as an attack on British troops. Campbell-Bannerman felt the need to clarify his remarks, saying 'I never said a word, which would imply cruelty... on the part of officers or men in the British Army'.<sup>33</sup> The Liberal Imperialists immediately denounced Campbell-Bannerman as he seemed to them to have joined the Pro-Boer camp.

H. C. G. Matthew has pointed out that the crisis over the 'methods of barbarism' speech was in part based on a misunderstanding. Campbell-Bannerman intended to make a specific denunciation of the concentration camps. However, the Liberal Imperialists took it as a move to drive them out of the party. As Haldane put it 'The party must be rescued from getting wholly and uselessly out of relation to the national sense'.<sup>34</sup> Even Asquith, who had until this point remained aloof from the internal dispute,

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was highly and publicly critical of Campbell-Bannerman. Asquith's Liberal Imperialist supporters organised a dinner for him (a standard method of the time of showing support for a politician), which was widely seen as a direct challenge to Campbell-Bannerman's lead-

ership. The conflict in the Liberal Party was parodied by the Parliamentary sketchwriter Henry Lucy as 'war to the knife – and fork'.<sup>35</sup>

In the event, the Asquith dinner was a damp squib. A party meeting at the Reform Club ten days earlier resulted in a vote of confidence for Campbell-Bannerman to which the Liberal Imperialists assented. In addition, Rosebery, having declined to preside at the Asquith dinner, upstaged his potential

ally by speaking at the City Liberal Club on the same day as Asquith's dinner in a speech in which he famously announced his intention to 'plough my furrow alone' – an apparent snub to Asquith.<sup>36</sup> Rosebery wanted to see a decisive split in the Liberal Party, but Grey, Asquith and Haldane were unwilling to break away without a commitment from Rosebery to make a political comeback. Given the show of unity at the Reform Club, Asquith could hardly raise the standard of rebellion now and so played down the divisions over South Africa, saying 'I have never called myself a Liberal Imperialist. The name of Liberal is good enough for me'.<sup>37</sup>

In September the breach widened further when Campbell-Bannerman repudiated the Liberal Imperialist candidate selected by the local Liberal association in the North-East Lanark by-election. He unofficially supported the Independent Labour Party candidate and the Unionists gained the seat with a split Liberal vote.<sup>38</sup> This increased the Liberal Imperialists' sense that they were being driven out of the party. They were losing the battle to control the structures of the Liberal Party – in December the National Liberal Federation passed a resolution broadly in line with Campbell-Bannerman's position on the concentration camps.<sup>39</sup> It was becoming clear that the party leader, rather than the Liberal Imperialists, could command the support of party organisations at regional and constituency level.<sup>40</sup>

## Rosebery's speech at Chesterfield

In order to revive their flagging fortunes, the Liberal Imperialists needed Rosebery who, as an ex-prime minister, had a wider public appeal than Asquith, Haldane or Grey. Rosebery announced his intention to address a meeting at Chesterfield on 16 December, and the Liberal Imperialists hoped this would mark his political comeback. Rosebery again demonstrated his flair for brilliant but enigmatic platform oratory. On the war he appeared con-

ciliatory to both wings of the party. He defended Milner and criticised the expression 'methods of barbarism' but accepted the National Liberal Federation resolution which criticised the camps and urged the government to make peace rather than insist on unconditional surrender.<sup>41</sup>

The speech repudiated many of the arguments of the Liberal Imperialists, but they preferred to ignore this as they hoped that Rosebery was now going to return to politics and resume his rightful position at the head of the Liberal Party. Sir Edward Grey wrote bluntly to his party leader that '... if you & Rosebery work together, I have no more to say & no new departure to make; if on the other hand you & he decide that you cannot co-operate I must say this: that I go with him'.<sup>42</sup> To many Liberals it seemed that the Chesterfield speech was a peace overture. Herbert Gladstone wrote to Campbell-Bannerman 'we ought to sink differences... since there is so much that is broad, generous and wise in what he says...'.<sup>43</sup>

Campbell-Bannerman, however, had a clearer understanding of Rosebery's intentions. He had noticed that while Rosebery's pronouncements on the war had struck a chord across a wide section of the party, other parts of the speech made demands that would be less palatable to mainstream Liberals. These included abandoning Irish Home Rule and adopting a 'clean slate' in domestic policy – that is repudiating the party's policy programme, which Rosebery saw as 'faddist' and likely to alienate floating voters. Campbell-Bannerman met Rosebery and confirmed that the latter was not envisaging a return to Liberal politics. Campbell-Bannerman wrote to C. P. Scott, the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, which had joined in the calls for reconciliation between Campbell-Bannerman and Rosebery:

there has been no offer of help to the Party – it was to the Country. He will not join in; even on the war. There never has been... any unwillingness on our part for his return: this is absolute. The impediment is that *he won't*.<sup>44</sup>

Campbell-Bannerman responded pub-



The pro-war press portrayed anti-war Liberals as eccentric and unfashionable. Liberals were criticised for having conceded self-government to the Transvaal after the Battle of Majuba in 1881. (*Punch*, 19 September 1900)

licly to the Chesterfield speech at a meeting of the London Liberal Federation in January and once again declared himself willing to see Rosebery return. In February Rosebery spoke at Liverpool, reiterating the importance of a 'clean slate' in domestic policy and of abandoning Home Rule. Campbell-Bannerman brought matters to a head by pronouncing against Rosebery, saying he was asking Liberals to 'sponge out every article of our creed'.<sup>45</sup> Rosebery promptly announced his complete separation from Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal Party. The Liberal Imperialists set up a new organisation, the Liberal League, with Rosebery as president and Asquith and Grey among the vice-presidents. It appeared to herald the launch of a breakaway political movement. But events took a different course: the peace of Vereeniging on 31 May brought the Boer War to an end and removed the main source of division within the Liberal Party.

The aftermath of the war saw a swift turn of the political tide. Uncomfortable questions were now asked about the government's conduct of a war in

which the world's largest empire had taken two-and-a-half years to defeat two tiny republics. In addition, the war had highlighted Unionist failings in social policy, with recruitment statistics showing a very high number of volunteers unfit for service. This was embarrassing to a party that had championed the cause of empire and an imperial race.<sup>46</sup> As a recent historian of the Conservative Party has written:

The Conservative Party's problems as the party of empire reached a crisis point with the Boer War. The military weaknesses, administrative incompetence and indeed social problems which the war has revealed laid the Conservatives open to the charge that, as the party of Empire, they had not done a particularly good job.<sup>47</sup>

The Unionist response to these problems made matters worse for them and helped to revive the Liberal Party. In 1903, Joseph Chamberlain, attempting to build on the imperial unity shown by the support of Britain's dominions for the war effort, launched his campaign for tariff reform with the aim of binding the empire together economically. The Liberal Party united behind a defence of free trade, one of its great causes. Asquith, working once again in tandem with Campbell-Bannerman, led the campaign in the country against tariffs. The Unionists split three ways: both free traders and tariff reformers resigned from the government while those in the middle tried in vain to find a workable compromise. In addition, the government's education bill, introduced in 1902, angered the Nonconformist Churches because it proposed state funding of church schools. Liberal Nonconformists, divided over the Boer War, now united to fight the education bill. Within a year of the end of the war the Liberal Party had recorded a steady stream of by-election gains. In 1904, the government's importation of Chinese indentured labourers to work the mines in the Transvaal enabled the Liberals to make political capital both on humanitarian grounds and over the apparent snub to British labour.

The restoration of unity within the Liberal Party was a remarkably easy process. As George L. Bernstein has argued, the war exaggerated the divisions

within the party and factionalising reinforced them. In fact the Liberal Imperialists had more in common with their fellow Liberals than they did with an imperialist visionary like Milner or, for that matter, with the semi-detached Rosebery.<sup>48</sup> It might be thought therefore, that the Liberal Imperialists were wrong in their analysis of the Liberal Party's electoral problems. Yet this would be an oversimplification. Despite their failure either to win control of the party or to launch a successful breakaway group, the Liberal Imperialists had a profound impact on the future of Liberalism. The party fought the 1906 election on a platform of not implementing Irish Home Rule during that Parliament, thus avoiding accusations of wanting to break up the empire and, with Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary, it proclaimed support for continuity with the Unionists in foreign policy. During the 1906–1915 Liberal Government the pacifist wing of the party (who had mostly been Pro-Boers) were able to exert little influence on overseas policy. By 1906, therefore, the party had taken great strides towards ridding itself of the image of being unpatriotic and it was a very different Liberal Party that won the 1906 general election from the one that lost that of 1900. The war had taught the party a lesson.

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- 1 For an analysis of Liberal opponents of empire see Porter, Bernard *Critics of empire: British Radical attitudes to colonialism in Africa 1895–1914* (London, 1968), especially Chapter 3; Price, Richard *An Imperial War and the British Working Class* (London and Toronto, 1972), Chapter 1 and Koss, Stephen *The Pro-Boers: the anatomy of an antiwar movement* (Chicago and London, 1973), 'Introduction'.
- 2 Matthew, H C G *The Liberal Imperialists: the ideas of politics of a post-Gladstonian elite* (Oxford, 1973)
- 3 Porter op. cit. p.75.
- 4 Robinson, Ronald and John Gallagher with Alice Denny *Africa and the Victorians: the official mind of imperialism* (London: 1961) p.410 ff.
- 5 The government was a coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists. In accordance with contemporary usage I have used the word 'Unionist' to describe the government throughout this article.
- 6 For a detailed study of Harcourt's handling of the aftermath of the Jameson Raid see Butler, J

- The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid* (Oxford, 1968), especially p.187 ff.
- 7 Gollin, A M *Proconsul in politics: a study of Lord Milner in opposition and power* (London, 1964) p.129
  - 8 Porter op. cit. p.77.
  - 9 Koss op. cit. p.38.
  - 10 John Auld 'The Liberal Pro-Boers', *Journal of British Studies* 14(2) (1975) p.82.
  - 11 Koss op. cit. p.xiv.
  - 12 Matthew op. cit. p.42.
  - 13 *Ibid.* p.52.
  - 14 John Burns diary 19 May 1900, British Library B.L. Add. MS 46318.
  - 15 Wilson, John C-B: *a life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman* (London, 1973) p.327.
  - 16 Hamer, D. A. *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery* (Oxford, 1972) p.298.
  - 17 Matthew op. cit. p.54.
  - 18 Blanche, M. D. 'British Society and the War' in Peter Warwick (ed.) *The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Harlow, 1980) p.223.
  - 19 *British general election manifestos, 1900–1974* Compiled and edited by F. W. S. Craig (London: Macmillan, 1975) pp.4–6.
  - 20 Marsh, Peter T. *Joseph Chamberlain: entrepreneur in politics* (New Haven and London, 1994) p.499.
  - 21 Auld op. cit. p.79.
  - 22 Richard Price *An Imperial War and the British Working Class* (London and Toronto, 1972); Henry Pelling *Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain* (London and Basingstoke, 1968) see particularly pp.94–96.
  - 23 Figures taken from Craig, F. W. S. *British parliamentary election results 1885–1918* (London, 1974).
  - 24 Quoted Porter op. cit. p.80.
  - 25 Wilson op. cit. p.338.
  - 26 Matthew op. cit. p.79ff.
  - 27 Koss *The Pro-Boers* pp.105–126.
  - 28 Grigg, John *The Young Lloyd George* (London, 1973) pp.286–287.
  - 29 Wilson op. cit. p.346–47
  - 30 *Ibid.* p.336.
  - 31 Spies, S. B. 'Women and the War' in Warwick op. cit. p.170.
  - 32 Wilson op. cit. p.349.
  - 33 *Ibid.* p.351.
  - 34 Matthew op. cit. pp.64–65
  - 35 Koss, Stephen *Asquith* (London, 1976) pp.54–55.
  - 36 Rhodes, James, Robert *Rosebery* (London, 1963) p.426.
  - 37 Koss *Asquith* p.56.
  - 38 Matthew op. cit. pp.74–75.
  - 39 *Ibid.* p.77.
  - 40 Wilson op. cit. p.367.
  - 41 Matthew op. cit. p.80–81.
  - 42 Robbins, Keith *Sir Edward Grey: a biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon* (London, 1971) p.98.
  - 43 Wilson op. cit. p.371.
  - 44 *Ibid.* p.374.
  - 45 *Ibid.* p.385.
  - 46 Searle, G. R. *The quest for national efficiency: a study in British politics and political thought 1899–1914* (Oxford, 1973) pp.60–61.
  - 47 Green, E. H. H. *The crisis of Conservatism: the politics, economics and ideology of the British Conservative Party, 1880–1914* (London, 1995) p.77
  - 48 Bernstein, George L. *Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England* (Winchester, Mass, 1986) pp.31–35.